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An Alternative to High Tech
Donald E. deKieffer*
In recent years American industry's ability to compete in the international
marketplace has appeared to decline. With a decreased world market shareI and a
balance of payments deficit2 many policymakers have concluded that traditional
industry is dying and that it is time to reassess American economic strength in
new and more advanced industries, that is, "high-tech" industries. The "failure"
of domestic "smokestack" industries producing automobiles, steel, and textiles
allegedly supports this view.
However, the problems of these industries are attributable to the current struc-
ture and climate of international and domestic trade. To offer any realistic solu-
tions, the following issues must be addressed: industry targeting practices by
foreign governments; the lack of adequate intellectual property right protection;
and "social policy disadvantages" imposed under United States (U.S.) law.
A high-tech versus smokestack industry analysis does not address these impor-
tant issues. This article examines the fallacy of the proposed high-tech solution
and offers realistic answers to the actual problem.
1. AMERICAN TRADE PROBLEMS AND HIGH-TECH PROPOSALS
American manufacturers face difficulties competing with foreign manufactur-
ers in the domestic and international marketplace. As a result, the U.S. trade
pattern represents two ends of a spectrum. On the one hand, it resembles that of a
developing country in that imports are manufactured products,3 while a major
portion of exports are extracted commodities. 4 On the other, it resembles that of
other highly developed countries, in that non-commodity exports are produced
by high technology and service industries.
In part, this problem is caused by the fact that in our market economy, high
quality goods at low prices outsell other goods regardless of country of origin.
Futhermore, manufactured imports are produced in developing countries such as
* Partner, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro; General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, 1981-83; B.A. 1968, University of Colorado; J.D. 1971, Georgetown University.
1. See TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT].
2. Id. at 9-11.
3. Id. at 16, Table 5.
4. Cf R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 238 (1983).
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the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Hong Kong,5 by American corporations with
overseas production operations. 6 Thus, another part of the U.S. problem is the
export of manufacturing operations.
If quality and price are the benchmarks of successful competition (and the
source of U.S. industrial woes), then we must ask how foreign competitors have
achieved these attributes. First, many of our trading partners engage in govern-
ment targeting and subsidization of certain industries. Industrial targeting is
generally defined as "coordinated government actions that direct productive re-
sources to give domestic producers in selected industries a competitive advan-
tage." 7 Targeting tools include home-market protection, 8 financial assistance, 9
tax incentives,' 0 scientific and technological assistance," and antitrust
exemptions. 12
Second, the inadequacy of U.S. laws protecting intellectual property facilitates
product imitation. 13 In many countries patent protection is contingent upon do-
mestic production of a product. 14 Thus the product of an American manufacturer
made in the United States may be freely copied abroad. But a foreign manufac-
turer's product patented in his home or another country is protected by the U.S.
patent laws. U.S. manufacturers must compete in the international marketplace
with foreign renditions of their own products. The American manufacturer is
without legal recourse in his competitor's system. "5 In the U.S. he may bring a
section 33716 or other unfair import practices action. 17
5. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1479, THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING
ON U.S. INDUSTRY 82, Table 1 (1984).
6. See infra notes 42, 59-62 and accompanying text.
7. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 1437, FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TARGETING AND ITS EFFECTS
ON U.S. INDUSTRIES, PHASE I : JAPAN 1 (1983). There are four elements to this definition of
targeting: it is done by governments; productive resources are directed; practices are applied only to
specific industries, and not to industry in general; and domestic producers receive a comparative
advantage from these actions. Id.
8. Id. at 5, 19-21. Home-market protection techniques include restraints on foreign investment,
tariffs, quotas, discriminatory government procurement, and other nontariff barriers. Id. at 20.
9. Id. at 5, 23-24. Financial assistance may take the form of preferential terms, loan guarantees,
export financing, preferential access to investment funds, preferential access to foreign exchange, and
nationalization. Id. at 20.
10. Id. at 5, 21. Favorable tax policies include special depreciation rules, exemptions for export
earnings, tax deferrals for export earnings, and grants. Id. at 20.
11. Id. at 9, 22-23; see also Industrial Competitiveness Act: Hearings on H.R. 4360 Before the
Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 65, 69 (1984) (statement of Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO).
12. Id. at 5, 21-22. Examples of antitrust exemptions are mergers, price fixing cartels, rationaliza-
tion cartels, joint research and development, and restrictions against competition. Id. at 20.
13. The cost of foreign production is reduced because the time, labor, expense and risk of research
and development is home by American producers.
14. See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (A. Green ed. 1983).
15. However, the manufacturer may petition the United States to initiate an international claim with
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel pursuant to § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Trade Act of 1974, § 301, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1982).
16. Tariff Act of 1930,'§ 337, as amended by Trade Act of 1974, §341 and Trade Agreements Act of
1979, § 1105, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
17. See Trade Act of 1974, § 301, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, 19 U.S.C.
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Third, production costs within the United States are generally higher because
social policy legislation imposes financial burdens on American industries. Only
a few other countries subject employers to the degree of minimum wage, over-
time payment, maximum hour, health and safety restrictions present in this
country. 11 Environmental protection standards directly impose additional costs
on industry. Trade regulation laws, such as antitrust laws, indirectly impose costs
by prohibiting industrial rationalization and sharing of information and research
and development expenses.
Recent proposed solutions to America's international trade problems promote
high-tech industries. Their proponents argue that since imports have narrowed
markets for many traditional American products, 19 American industry should
redirect its energies into the production of high-tech goods, goods with much of
their value derived from research and development. 20 The proposals purportedly
would alter the U.S. trade pattern, shifting it toward "sophisticated industrial
products," thereby increasing U.S. exports.
The theory of comparative advantage underlies these proposals. It argues that a
country should export those products for which it has an abundance of the crucial
factors of production. 2 According to high-tech advocates, the U.S. has a relative
abundance of the "human capital" essential to the development of high-tech
industries. 22
Often, deliberate government-abetted development of high-tech industries is
the touchstone of national industrial policy proposals. Therefore, in order to
discuss whether a high technology strategy makes sense, the concept of a na-
tional industrial policy must be considered.
High-tech advocates tend to look to the industrial policy practices of major
Western competitors. They credit planned industrial strategies, including govern-
ment-industry collaboration, with the success of U.S. competitors and the rela-
tive decline in performance of U.S. industries.23 They argue that American
industries cannot compete against foreign industries receiving direct government
support including, but not limited to, grants, tax breaks, and loans. Robert Reich
typifies the high-tech advocates when he says "the real choice facing America is
rather between evading the new global context or engaging it-between protect-
ing the American economy from the international market while generating paper
profits, or adapting it to meet international competition. Either way, government
§ 2411 (1982); Tariff Act of 1930, § 701, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19
U.S.C. § 1671 (1982) (countervailing duties); Tariff Act of 1930, § 731, as amended by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982) (anti-dumping).
18. Examples are Japan, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Sweden. See R.
REICH, supra note 4, at 251-54. It also should be noted that in many of these countries distinctions
between labor and management are less clear, since workers participate more in industrial
management.
19. See R. MCKENZIE, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE 15
(Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 275, July 12, 1983).
20. See id. at 6 (discussing the proposals of Walter Mondale).
21. D. RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81-87 (1933 ed.); see
also M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 215-18 (3d ed. 1979).
22. See R. MACKENZIE, supra note 19, at 4 (discussing the proposals of Robert Reich).
23. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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will be actively involved." ' z4 Increased government involvement in industry is
thus claimed to be inevitable.
Although national industrial policy proposals cannot be neatly categorized, 25
there are recurring themes. These themes are variations of the widely criticized
industrial targeting practices of U.S. competitors. 26 High-tech national industrial
policy advocates propose that the government restructure the tax system to en-
courage the development of high-tech industries;27 establish banks or finance
corporations to help companies with capital investment and restructuring28 and
use education, patent laws, and government procurement policies to stimulate
research and development in the high-tech area. 29 Implementation of these pro-
posals would amount to a national industrial policy for high-tech industries.
In sum, high-tech national industrial policy proposals involve a government
induced and funded shift from traditional, smokestack industries into future-
sensitive high-tech industries. These proposals argue for the development of a
U.S. policy acknowledging the demise of heavy industry, encouraging "adjust-
ment" away from traditional sectors such as textiles and steel and emphasizing
development of industries such as bioengineering, computers, and fiber optics.
This program would be multi-faceted, demanding the same sort of national
commitment as required by the space race. Allegedly it would re-industrialize
America with "industries of the future," 30 while promoting full employment in
the traditional sectors in the newly industrialized countries.
II. THE HIGH-TECH APPROACH IS UNTENABLE
High-tech proponents hope to solve the trade problems of the U.S. manufac-
turers through the development of high-tech industries. However, their proposed
solution actually circumvents the core issue. The trade problem of the U.S. is to
find a way to improve the competitiveness of existing industries in the domestic
and international marketplaces.
A. High-tech Is Undefined
The first problem with the high-tech approach is that the term itself defies
definition. 3 Certain industries, such as bioengineering, microelectronics, fiber
optics, and sophisticated avionics, are clearly high-tech. However, others cannot
be classified as easily. Any attempt to create an objective test to distinguish high-
24. R. REICH, supra note 4, at 232.
25. NAT'L HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE (1984).
26. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
27. See R. MCKENZIE, supra note 19, at 3-13, for a discussion of the proposals of Gary Hart,
Robert Reich, and Timothy Wirth.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. R. REICH, supra note 4, at 236.
31. The House Democratic Caucus is in accord with this view. See NAT'L HOUSE DEMOCRATIC
CAUCUS, supra note 25, at 29.
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tech from traditional industries defies rational conclusions. Factor analysis exam-
ining the sophistication of the technology involved in production or the level of
research achieved in product development is unhelpful. Many so-called smoke-
stack industries in the U.S. are as technologically advanced as any in the world.
The U.S. textile industry uses state-of-the-art computers, lasers and other sophis-
ticated equipment. 32 American textile manufacturers are the most efficient in the
world. 33 Their problems are caused by high domestic interest rates, low foreign
wage rates, and the strength of the U.S. dollar 34-not unsophisticated
technology.
Proponents of a high-tech national industrial policy often define high-tech
enterprises as those requiring a significant investment in research and develop-
ment. They argue that because these manufacturers must undertake a substantial
financial risk, they will not become competitive until the government assumes a
portion of that risk. 35 This argument is fallacious. First, the test is over-inclusive.
Under it the pharmaceutical industry, which produces an unsophisticated prod-
uct-drugs, merits high-tech status because it invests large amounts of money in
research and development. 36 Furthermore, product development requiring exten-
sive research and development need not be expensive if one industry can take
advantage of the research of another. The American textile industry, for example,
has benefited from the research of the textile machine industry. " Similarly, the
aircraft industry has benefited from military industrial research.38
Second, even if extensive research and development is an essential factor in the
development of high-tech industries, the assumption of this cost by the federal
government is inappropriate. Companies do not engage in research and develop-
ment for altruistic reasons. They expect to make a fair return on their capital
whether they invest it in research and development or new machinery.
In attempting to define high-tech in this manner, proponents of a high-tech
national industrial policy may be suggesting that the U.S. Government should
"subsidize" U.S. manufacturers to the extent necessary to compensate for the
intervention of foreign governments in private enterprise. Thus if country A gives
funds to its steel industry, the United States should do the same. In this light it is
clear that the issue should be discussed under the general rubric of targeting39 -
not in terms of a high-tech/smokestack distinction.
32. Hamilton, High-Tech Revolution Makes, Breaks Jobs, Wash. Post, July 27, 1982, § A, at I.
33. Textiles: An Essential Industry, AMERICA'S TEXTILES, Aug. 1982, at 32c, 32p [hereinafter
cited as Textiles].
34. See BUREAU OF INDUST. ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1983 INDUSTRIAL OUT-
LOOK 39-1 to 39-10 (1983).
35. Cf R. REICH, supra note 4, at 141, 157.
36. The actual production of pharmaceuticals is well within the technological grasp of even the
most modestly developed countries. In the pharmaceutical industry research and development costs
do not go to development of production methods but to determining which combination of chemicals
will achieve a particular result.
37. See GATT SECRETARIAT, TEXTILES AND CLOTHING IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 33 (1984).
38. R. REICH, supra note 4, at 233.
39. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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B. High-tech Industries Will Not Necessarily Be More Successful
Even if high-tech industries were definable, it is incorrect to assume that they
would be more successful than traditional ones. America's relative ability to
compete in international markets has little to do with the high-tech character of its
industry.
Most traditional industries are either doing quite well or are non-competitive
for reasons other than their ability to keep pace technologically. The textile
industry, for example faces stiff competition from lesser-developed countries
with less sophisticated technological know-how. 40 Their advantage lies in lower
labor costs. 41 Some U.S. producers have moved their production operations
abroad to take advantage of cheap labor. In the high-tech industry, Microdata and
Intel, two electronics and computer firms, established plants in Barbados. Apple,
Digital Equipment, and Hewlett-Packard manufacture many of their products in
Singapore. 42 Thus, assuming no controls on capital mobility, government aid to
high technology industries may create more jobs in newly industrialized coun-
tries than in the United States.
Production costs of competitors often are lower because they take advantage of
research and innovations developed by U.S. manufacturers. The United States is
the world's leading exporter of technology. 43 Many overseas manufacturing
plants were established by Americans with American technology, equipment,
and managerial skills.4 Reverse engineering of products and equipment and
technology licensing agreements have cut short development time and investment
by our trading partners. The Japanese spend comparatively little on research and
development but achieve high quality because they concentrate their capital in-
vestment in production after taking advantage of the technological advances of
others. 45 There is no reason to believe that the high-tech industries will be
immune to these trends.
Even if some traditional American industries cannot compete internationally
because of a lack of technological sophistication, their competitive position
would likely be improved by incorporating and adopting the latest technological
advances. Any American industry, traditional or high-tech, must be on the cut-
ting edge of available technology to compete effectively. 46
40. See Textiles, supra note 33, at 32p.
41. See id.
42. McCartney, Our Newest High-Tech Export: Jobs, DATAMATION, May 1983, at 114, 117.
43. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM-
MERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES 36-37 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES].
44. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
45. See Industrial Policy, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 696-98 (1983)
(statement of Regis McKenna on behalf of the Berkeley Roundtable on International Economy).
46. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. AFMD-83-68, FEDERAL EFFORTS REGARDING
AUTOMATED MANUFACTURING NEED STRONGER LEADERSHIP 3 (1983).
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C. High-Tech Industries Are Not the Wave of the Future
High-tech industries are not the wave of the future for the United States in
international trade. Admittedly, high-tech production presents new markets
which the United States should enter. But there is a difference between taking
advantage of the opportunity to expand production and marketing capacity and
creating a national industrial policy to shift production resources from traditional
industries to new fields. The latter is speculation at best and dangerous at worst.
The traditional industries are, and have been, the backbone of American eco-
nomic strength. 47 They are likely to remain so. Political, demographic and even
national defense reasons will compel the retention of our heavy industrial sectors.
High-tech industries are presently characterized by double-digit growth.
48
However, such increases cannot continue indefinitely in any industry or in any
country. Such rates are, in large part, a mathematical phenomenon of a zero base.
This does not suggest that high-tech industries should be abandoned, but rather
that traditional industries which have demonstrated an ability to provide jobs and
an economic base for the nation should be maintained.
Furthermore, the assumption of the high-tech proposals that the government
can predict which industries will be "winners" and which will be "losers" is
unfounded. High-tech advocates, pointing to the Japanese example, link the
development of high-tech industry to government targeting.4 9 Yet, it not clear that
such government planning and funding is successful. If Japan is to serve as the
archetype for nationally-planned industrial development, then the reality of the
Japanese experience must be examined. Government planning is not the sole
source of Japanese industrial stability. Other structural and social policies ac-
count for Japan's success.
Japan's public expenditures on industrial development are not as large as many
Americans believe. In the 1970s the Japanese Government paid for less than 30
percent of Japan's total research and development spending; in contrast, the U.S.
Government funded over 50 percent. 5 0 Many of the most successful Japanese
industries were neither targeted nor government-funded. The computer industry,
for example, actually received very little financial assistance. 51 Similarly, the
automobile and consumer electronics industries enjoyed few government bene-
fits, other than generally available tax treatment and import restrictions. 52 In fact,
47. See Industrial Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-96 (1983) (prepared statement of
Fred Bergsten, Director, Inst. for Int'l Economics).
48. See TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
50. K. SAKOH, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE SUPER MYTH OF JAPAN'S SUPER SUCCESS 3 (Asian
Studies Center Backgrounder No. 3, Heritage Foundation, July 13, 1983).
51. Id. at 10. For example, the machine and information industries, which include computers,
received only .8 percent of their total investment from government special loans during 1976-1979.
Id.
52. Magaziner, Japanese Industrial Policy: Source of Strength for the Automobile Industry, in THE
JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: MODEL AND CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE 79, 80 (R. Cole ed.
1981).
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in the 1960s the automobile industry rejected the Ministry of International Trade's
(MITI) plan to merge automobile firms. 53 Yet, even without large scale as-
sistance, the individual automobile firms have been very successful. As David
Henderson points out, "individual initiative, not central planning, is the main
source of Japan's growth."
5 4
The Japanese Government's selection of "winners" and "losers" is not the sole
source of Japan's prosperity. It cannot be assumed that any government can
achieve economic prosperity through such predictions. Even the most sophisti-
cated private sector analyses are often quite wrong in their assumptions regarding
companies and whole industries. 55 Governments, hampered by the slow, cumber-
some bureaucratic decision-making process, are even more likely to make errors
which are hard to detect and difficult to correct.
D. Neither American Industry Nor Labor Will Prosper from High-Tech
Promotion
Even if substantial benefits were granted to high-tech industries by the govern-
ment, there is little assurance that American industry and American workers
would reap the fruits of government sponsorship. Growth in high-tech industries
probably will not affect U.S. domestic employment. High-tech advocates claim
that the new industry will create more jobs-that workers dismissed because of
plant closures in traditional industries will be absorbed by high-tech com-
panies. 56 However, some experts predict a different scenario, one with high
unemployment among the unskilled. 57 There is no consensus regarding the
number of jobs that will be created through the development of high-tech
industries.
Even if domestic jobs were created, there is no reason to believe that they
would remain in the U.S. Despite their advertising campaigns promoting a "buy
American" attitude,58 high-tech firms are not necessarily "buying American" in
the labor market. Many of these corporations have gone abroad to take advantage
of lower wages and minimal or non-existent corporate taxes. 59 Firms move
abroad in one of two ways. Some, like Atari, develop and produce their product
overseas. 6 The more prevalent method, however, is to develop the product and
manufacturing capacity in the United States, and then move "growing" volume
53. Henderson, A Difference of Opinion: The Myth of MITI, FORTUNE, Aug. 8, 1983, at 113.
Henderson also points out that when a small Japanese electronics firm requested permission from
MITI to purchase transistor manufacturing rights from Western Electric, MITI refused. Two years
later MITI reversed its decision and the company, SONY, "went on to fame and fortune." Id.
54. Id.
55. Atari, a subsidiary of Warner Communications, exemplifies the erroneous analyses of private
sector experts in the high-tech arena.
56. See Hamilton, supra note 32, at 16.
57. Id.
58. See McCartney, supra note 42, at 114.
59. See id.; UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES, supra note 43.
60. See McCartney, supra note 42, at 117.
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production abroad. 61 Government funding of high-tech research and development
will not give rise to American jobs if companies take the results overseas.
Offshore development also imposes large, indirect costs on the domestic econ-
omy. Not only are domestic jobs lost, but goods produced abroad compete as
imports with domestically manufactured products. These "imports" are pro-
duced at a lower cost and can be sold at a lower price than American-made
products. American firms forced to compete against these lower priced goods
either die or move their production operations abroad. 62 Either way, American
industry and workers suffer.
American-developed high technology and jobs will be transferred overseas no
matter what the funding source. This is particularly likely to happen if the
liberalized technology transfer provisions so fervently advocated by high-tech
proponents63 are put into effect. Shifting "growing" volume production abroad
entails transferring technology. Many high technology products originally devel-
oped in the United States were quickly imitated by our foreign competitors.
Pharmaceuticals, circuit boards, transistors, television sets, radios, consumer
electronics, and the like were born in the United States and quickly indentured
abroad. 64 Japanese industries are prime examples of research and development
pilferers; the Japanese take advantage of the technological developments of oth-
ers and therefore need spend little time and money on innovation. 65 This perhaps
is not altogether bad and might be cited as an example of the way the free market
is supposed to work. However, it is another matter to suggest that the American
taxpayer underwrite research and development for American producers and thus
effectively underwrite research costs for foreign manufacturers and promote
foreign employment at the expense of domestic employment.
III. A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO A HIGH-TECH NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
A high-tech national industrial policy is not the solution to America's interna-
tional trade problems. The proposal is based on false assumptions and its
implementation would cost billions of dollars. Moreover, it would acknowledge
as fact something that is simply not true. U.S. industries are not structurally
incapable of competing in a rational world economy.
61. Id.
62. See id.
For example, three or four years ago Televideo came into the market with an exact copy of
the Lear Siegler 80M31 terminal and was using offshore sourcing from Korea and doing the
final assembly and testing here. This was the first product that TVI came out with, and it beat
Lear Siegler's price by about 25 to 30 percent. All of a sudden Lear Siegler was faced with a
situation where it had to reduce costs if it was going to succeed in the market. The company
started to investigate offshore sourcing opportunities.
Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 32 (discussing Japan's SONY Corporation).
65. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Industrial competitiveness does not depend on the promotion of high-tech
industries over traditional smokestack industries. Industrial competitiveness is
determined by industry and market structure, 66 labor force costs, 67 characteristics
of professional personnel ,68 availability of materials and components, 69 support-
ing infrastructure, 70 ingenuity,7' business and economic conditions, 72 govern-
ment involvement, 73 and international trade relations. 74 Japanese industrial
success, for example, can be attributed at least partially to government action, tax
66. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, U.S. INDUSTRIAL COM-
PETITIVENESS 69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as OTA Report]. "The number of firms, their size and
production facilities, and degree of concentration and integration influence competition. Market
structure includes the size, availability, rate of growth and degree of saturation of the market." Id.
(emphasis in original).
67. Id. "Both labor costs and availability of skilled workers are important: Government support
for the training and education of the work force can be critical. The nature of labor-management
relations, type of unions, and mechanisms for worker participation also can influence productivity
and competitiveness." Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id. "Quality of management and technical personnel are significant determinants of com-
petitiveness. Import characteristics include: the attitudes and value structure of management; ag-
gressiveness in developing, marketing, and exporting products; and the degree of interaction and
cooperation within thefirm among R&D, marketing, product planning, manufacturing engineering,
and quality control personnel." Id. (emphasis in original).
69. Id. 'Assured supplies of the inputs to the manufacturing process (iron ore, petroleum, elec-
tronics components) are important for planning and long-term stability. Domestic availability versus
dependence on imports can be important." Id. (emphasis in original).
70. Id. "The infrastructure includes the vendors, subcontractors, other suppliers, and services
necessary to support complex technologically based industries. Also included are basic research
organizations and the level of government support for generic R&D." Id. (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
Factors that more directly affect the ability to innovate and the rate of technology diffusion
include: the interactions and synergies among firms within an industry (mobility of personnel,
licensing and other interchanges of technology, openness to inward transfers of technology
and management know-how); and the existence of clusters of skills as among the semiconduc-
tor firms in Silicon Valley.
Id. (emphasis in original).
72. Id.
Included here are indicators of overall economic performance such as GNP or GDP, levels
of disposable income, and inflation rates. The nature of capital markets (concentration of
banking and credit) affect the ability of firms and industries to expand. Also important are less
tangible factors such as consumer confidence, investment expectations, and the general cli-
mate of political stability and social welfare.
Id. (emphasis in original).
73. Id.
Government regulations that impinge on factory work, supplies of resources, design and
sale of products, tax policies, Government procurement policies, and antitrust policies and
their interpretations all affect the attitudes and decisions of business. In addition, more
intangible factors which are nevertheless important include the tradition of cooperation or
conflict within and among government, business, and labor.
Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Id.
Policies enacted by domestic and foreign governments affecting imports and exports such
as taxes on overseas profits, tariffs on imports and reimports after offshore assembly, export
credits and subsidies, exchange rates, policies toward technology transfer, and nontariff
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and antitrust policies, international trade relations, and import restrictions." It is
to these factors that U.S. policy should be addressed.
A. Proposed U.S. Response to Foreign Targeting
High-tech proposals presume some effective U.S. policy to counter industrial
targeting 76 practices of foreign governments. While the Japanese are often cited
for this practice, particularly in the high technology area,77 such targeting is not
confined to either Japan 7 or to high technology.79 Although the targeting prac-
tices of our trading partners are not the primary reason for American industry's
inability to compete, the United States must develop a means of either countering
or offsetting its effects. 80 High-tech advocates argue for government subsidiza-
tion of American research and development. A more appropriate response is
outlined below.
First, the United States should attempt through international agreements to
assure American access to foreign research and development programs. The
recently negotiated Japanese technology sharing agreement81 is a step in the right
direction.
Second, the United States should develop an antitrust policy permitting Ameri-
can companies to take advantage of foreign-subsidized research and development
and allowing them to participate in joint research and development with other
American companies. Currently, joint activities among American firms are se-
verely restricted by U.S. antitrust law. 2
Third, the United States should actively oppose foreign research and develop-
ment subsidization. A code regulating such expenditures should be the ultimate
goal. In the meantime, the United States should exercise its existing General
barriers set the environment for international competition. International agreements and or-
ganizations often provide the framework for such policies.
Id. (emphasis in original).
75. See INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 7, at 46-49.
76. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
77. See INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 7, at 141-46.
78. See id. Although the ITC report focuses on Japan's industrial targeting, it is only Part I of a
series on targeting. Parts II and III will examine the targeting practices of European Community
countries and other selected countries. Id. at I.
79. See id. The report examines targeting practices in specific industries including the "tradi-
tional" industries of aluminum, automobiles, iron and steel. See id. at 128-31, 138-41.
80. The European Community, for example, has "targeted" third country markets for their surplus
agricultural production. Obviously, this is not a high-tech question; it is, however, a targeting
question to which the United States should respond immediately. One of the more effective ways for
the United States to answer this sort of tactic would be to make subsidization too expensive for the
Europeans by threatening to engage in this practice itself unless mutually acceptable "reductions in
force" were negotiated.
81. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Recommendations of
the U.S.-Japan Work Group on High Technology Industries (Feb. 1983) (copy on file, Michigan
Yearbook of Int'l Legal Studies); Hershey, More Technology Sales in Japan Opened to U.S., N.Y.
Times, Feb. II, 1983, at D4.
82. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INT'L OPERATIONS 19-31
(Jan. 26, 1977; revised Mar. 1, 1977).
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Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) rights to oppose such policies, through
litigation if necessary.
Fourth, the United States should establish a monitoring system to identify
targeting practices of foreign countries and to recommend appropriate responses.
In the short run, the injured domestic industries might find temporary relief
from unfair foreign competition in countervailing duty,83 antidumping, s4 and
unfair import practices laws. 1
5
B. Proposed U.S. Response to Counterfeiting and Patent Infringement
For many industries, patent protection is the sine qua non of commercial
success. Foreign manufacturers, often with the connivance of their governments,
regularly raid American research and development and capture large profits.
6
For many countries, especially newly industrialized countries, the phrase
"technology transfer" is the polite term for industrial larceny. Similarly, many
countries wink at the reproduction of patented goods without a license-counter-
feiting is a major industry for many of America's trading partners.87 Unless
American industry can enjoy more exclusively the benefits of its own innova-
tions, our costs will be disproportionately high and our competitiveness
undermined. 88
The United States needs an effective response to these practices. Specifically,
it should encourage the adoption of the Counterfeit Code,8 9 amend U.S. law to
permit seizure of all counterfeiters' assets within the reach of our jurisdiction,
pursue section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 remedies against patent violations and
counterfeits in third country markets, and consider conditioning the granting of
privileges based on the Generalized System of Preferences 9° on a country's
adherence to the Paris Convention 9' and the Counterfeit Code.
92
83. Tariff Act of 1930, § 701, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. §
1671 (1982).
84, Tariff Act of 1930, § 731, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. §
1673 (1982).
85. Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, as amended by Trade Act of 1974, § 341 and rade Agreements Act
of 1979, § 1105, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
86. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 24-29.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
89. A draft of Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods is
currently being worked on by the United States and several of its trading partners. This proposed
Agreement was first developed in 1979 at the end of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
90. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 501. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982).
91. The Paris Convention, Stockholm Revision, opened for signature July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923. The ris Convention is a multilateral agreement on industrial property,
including trademarks. It was originally entered into on March 20, 1883, was revised in 1900, 1911,
1925, 1934, 1958, and 1967. The 1967 revision, (known as the Stockholm revision) entered into force
for the United States on September 5, 1970, with exception of Articles I through XII, which entered
into force on August 25, 1973 for the United States.
92. See supra note 89.
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C. The Industrial Costs of Social Policies
The United States needs to adopt economic and social policies which take
cognizance of the long-term ability of American industry to compete efficiently
both at home and abroad. Such policies should recognize the burdens and costs
imposed on American industry by social and economic decisions.
For example, before a decision is made to charge utilities in eastern Ohio
hundreds of millions of dollars to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions which might
cause acid rain in Canada, a careful analysis should be done of the competitive
effects on the region's aluminum industry. Utilities would pass on the increased
cost to consumers, thus making American aluminum significantly less com-
petitive both at home and abroad.
This type of subsidy is fair, reasonable, and manageable. Such a program
would not violate any international obligations, principles of fairness, or eco-
nomic good sense and it would enable American industries to compete effec-
tively. Since clean air benefits all citizens as well as conforming with
international obligations of the United States, the people (i.e. the government),
rather than American industry, should bear the expense. The problem here is not
foreign "targeting" but the disproportionate imposition of social costs upon
otherwise competitive enterprises.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Government's response to other countries' industrial programs
should not be imitation, particularly when it would cause severe injury to our
own industries. The U.S. should adopt new and flexible programs responsive to
the real causes of American industry's inability to compete. These causes rarely
lie in technology but rather in burdens we have imposed upon ourselves.
To adopt a government-controlled industrial policy under the rubric of high-
tech is both short-sighted and dangerous.
- It would be expensive.
- It would cost more jobs than it would create.
- It would involve the subsidization of other countries' industries by U.S.
taxpayers.
- It would ignore the real problems of our traditional industries which cur-
rently provide millions of jobs.
- It would divert resources into questionable and even ridiculous high-tech
schemes.
- It would not be guided by the traditional forces which weed bad ideas from
the free market.
In short, the high-tech initiative is a bad idea; but to reject it as a solution to
our economic problems is not to suggest a "business as usual" approach. The
United States should adopt economic and trade policies which would guarantee a
"level playing field" for U.S. companies competing in domestic and foreign
markets. As part of this program, the government should: (1) vigorously enforce
our unfair trade practice laws including antidumping and countervailing duty
laws; (2) enact legislation granting greater protection to intellectual property
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rights; (3) encourage joint research and development through modifications in
our antitrust laws; (4) seek greater discipline in international fora such as the
GATT to oppose subsidization of foreign research and development; and (5)
carefully examine the competitive impact of our social laws and policies. If the
cost of such policies is to make a sector of American industry noncompetitive,
serious consideration should be given to public funding of such social objectives.
These measures should correct the U.S. trade deficit and thus provide long
term prosperity.
